Valuation and use of complex ecosystems: An economist's view  by Rauscher, Michael
Limnologica 29 (1999) 335-338 L IMNOLOGICA 
http://www.urbanfischer.de/j ournals/limno 
© by Urban & Fischer Verlag 
Universit~it Rostock (Germany) and Centre of Economic Policy Research, London (U.K.) 
Valuation and Use of Complex Ecosystems: An Economist's View 
MICHAEL RAUSCHER 
With one Figure 
Key words: Valuation of ecosystems, renewable r sources, dynamic optimisation, common-property resources 
Abstract 
This paper surveys approaches to the economic valuation of ecosys- 
tems and the determination f their optimal utilisation. The compo- 
nents of the value of ecosystems are defined and methods of mea- 
surement are presented. Also discussed isa simple model of the eco- 
nomic use of a dynamic ecological system. Economically optimal 
trajectories are shown and scenarios are presented inwhich it is eco- 
nomically optimal to destroy the ecosystem. Particular problems 
arise if the ecosystem is a common-property resource as is often the 
case with marine ecosystems. This issue is also addressed. More- 
over, the paper presents some xtensions ofthe model that add com- 
plexity and uncertainty. 
1. Introduction 
Human society and its economic system are embedded 
into the natural environment. For a long time, economists 
neglected this connection in their research taking for 
granted the availability of nature's ervices to society. 
Even though this has changed some during the last twenty- 
five years, the economists' understanding of ecological 
systems is still rather limited. Ecologists, in contrast, end- 
ed to disregard the impact of the economic and social sys- 
tems on nature. They often lack the knowledge of how 
economic systems and their policy instruments function 
and consequently have difficulties in addressing the norm- 
ative aspects of the problem beyond a general description. 
The intent of this paper is to present issues where 
economists and ecologists can learn from each other and 
where a process of cross-fertilisation could yield impor- 
tant results. Since I myself am an economist, I will start 
from an economic point of view, but I try to incorporate el- 
ements of population biology to model the dynamics of 
ecological systems. 
2. The Valuation of Ecosystems 
Ecosystems have an economic value which can be ex- 
pressed, e.g., in monetary terms. This value may be explicit 
(e.g. if a cost-benefit analysis is undertaken) or implicit (if a 
decision to intervene into an ecosystem or to preserve it is 
made without an explicit monetarisation). The economic 
value of an ecosystem can be viewed as consisting of three 
components ( ee PEARCE & TURNER 1990, ch. 9). 
Actual use value. This is the value of an ecosystem deter- 
mined on the basis of its contemporaneous uses. Examples in 
the case of aquatic systems are the values of their fish stocks, 
its water quality (e.g. for people who like to swim in lakes, 
rivers, or in the sea), and their function as sewage treatment 
devices. Some components ofuse value are directly measur- 
able via market prices, e.g. the value of fish stocks, whereas 
others uch as water quality are not. 
Option value. There are potential uses of ecosystems that 
are not yet known or relevant today. An example is biodiver- 
sity. Biodiversity loss mainly affects species whose use to 
humankind has not been recognised yet. Thus, we lose the 
option to benefit in the future from these species. Since op- 
tions are valuable, this is a real economic loss. Usually, it is 
not directly measurable. 
Existence value. Existence value is the part of the value 
of a resource which is not based on benefits derived from ac- 
tual or potential future uses. People derive utility from the 
knowledge that there are still white rhinos, blue whales, and 
other rare species ,,out there". Existence value can also be 
defined as an intrinsic value of a resource or a species as put 
forth in the animal-rights debate. 
Many ecological systems are common-property esources 
with ill-defined property rights. Thus, there exist no market 
prices which contain information about expected future ben- 
efits from the conservation f these resources and about heir 
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non-use value. How can these things be determined? 
Economists use basically three methods to come to results 
[see BRADEN & KOLSTAD (1991) or JOHANSON (1987) 
for comprehensive overviews and PEARCE & TURNER 
(1990, ch. 10) for a brief survey]. 
Contingent valuation. One can simply ask people how 
much they are willing to pay to conserve certain ecosystems 
or habitats. Of course, this method is problematic n many re- 
spects, including design of the questionnaires, framing of the 
questions, selection of the samples, information of the inter- 
viewed people, and biased responses due to the practical ir- 
relevance of the reported willingness to pay. 
Hedonic pricing. The idea is to look at the market prices 
of goods whose value is decisively influenced by environ- 
mental variables. An example are house prices. They do not 
only depend on the properties of the house but also on air and 
noise pollution and on the properties of the neighbourhood. 
The approach uses multivariate regression analysis. The re- 
sult is a measure of observed willingness to pay (instead of 
hypothetical willingness to pay as in the case of contingent 
valuation). Hedonic pricing is useful for some environmental 
problems but not for all. Option values, for instance, have 
rather weak and indirect impacts on the prices of marketable 
commodities. 
Travel cost method. People spend money and time to 
enjoy nature. Both can be measured and used to determine 
the value of natural resources, e.g. a national park. Again the 
basis of measurement is the observed rather than the hypo- 
thetical willingness to pay. However, this approach is rather 
limited since it only measures a part of the value of an envi- 
ronmental resource or ecosystem. What is not measured is 
the value of uses that are not yet known today and the non- 
use value of the resource. 
A taxonomy of ecosystem values and valuation methods 
is summarised in Table 1. 
3. The Use of Simple and Complex 
Ecological Systems 
How can the interactions of the ecological and economic 
systems be modelled? The appropriate modelling framework 
is inherently dynamic. One reason is the intertemporal trade- 
off between the welfare of the present and that of future gen- 
erations. The second reason is the dynamic nature of ecolog- 
ical systems. An ecological systems reacts to disturbances 
but the adjustment speed is finite and depends on the state of 
the system. Ecologists refer to this as resilience (HOLLING 
1973). Another feature of ecosystems i their complexity. 
They usually consist of many (often thousands, sometimes 
millions) of interacting species. None the less, I will start 
with a single-species model. This may be taken literally but 
it may also be interpreted as an aggregation of a multidimen- 
sional ecosystem. Human society extracts resources and uses 
them for economic purposes. In my model, the extraction 
rate simply reduces the resource base, but the generalisation 
to more general, non-linear, modes of interaction between 
economy and ecology is straightforward. I neglect evolution- 
ary aspects of both the ecological and economic systems. 
Technological progress in the economic system and evolu- 
tionary change in the ecological system are disregarded. 
a) A Simple Reference Model 
Let there be n identical units (fishing vessels exploiting a 
fishery or countries using a common resource base) using a 
renewable resource whose stock at time t is R(t) .  The initial 
resource stock, R °, is exogenously given and there is a regen- 
eration function g(R( t ) )  having the usual shape. In the inter- 
val (R~,R"), 0 < R ~ < R u , the g(.) function is concave and non- 
negative. R~ is the minimum stock necessary for the survival 
of the species or the ecosystem and R ~ is the maximum stock 
of the species or the maximum level of environmental quali- 
ty. This level corresponds to an ecosystem undisturbed by 
human intervention. Let the extraction rate at time t be x(t )  
for each unit. A dot above a variable denoting the time 
derivative of a variable, the change in the resource stock can 
be written as: 
k( t )  = g(R(t)) - nx(t). (1) 
Let there be a social planner maximising the representa- 
tive unit's utility. The utility function, u(.,.) depends on the 
extraction rate and on the resource stock. Moreover, it is as- 
sumed to be increasing in its arguments and strictly concave. 
The impact of the resource stock on utility includes option 
value and existence value of the resource. The planner's ob- 
jective is to maximise the present value of all future utility 
Table 1. A taxonomy of ecosystem values and valuation methods. 
Category of value Application to marine cosystems Applicable valuation methods 
Actual use value 
a) directly measurable 








hedonic pricing, travel cost, cont. valuation 
contingent valuation 
contingent valuation 
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flows with respect to the extraction rate over an infinite time 
horizon. With a discount rate r > 0, the objective function is 
f e-" u(x(t), R(t)) (2) dr. 
0 
The constraints are (1) and the transversality conditions 
R(0) = R ° and limr_~= R(t)  > O. 
The solution of this problem is a straightforward one in 
economics [see CLARK (1990, ch. 6) for a similar model 
having the same algebraic structure]. Let us define the value 
of the resource as p(t).  Using Pontryagin's maximum princi- 
ple (CHIANG 1992), one can show that along an optimal tra- 
jectory p(t)  is determined by 
p = ux/n  (3) 
where subscripts denote partial derivatives and where the ar- 
guments of the functions have been omitted for convenience. 
This result can be interpreted as follows. If an additional unit 
of the resource is extracted, the resource stock is reduced by 
this unit and the welfare loss is p. At the same time, the repre- 
sentative user has a utility gain of u~/n. In an optimum, 
marginal gains equal marginal losses and this explains eq, (3). 
There is a long-run equilibrium characterised by
g' + nu R/u, = r (4) 
where g' is the derivative of g with respect to R. The econom- 
ic interpretation of this condition is the following one. The 
resource is a store of value, i.e. an asset. On the right-hand 
side, there is the discount rate,which can be interpreted as the 
rate of return to an alternative asset. On the left-hand side, 
there is the marginal rate of reproduction of the resource plus 
a term measuring the marginal benefit o be derived from the 
existence of the resource. These two terms represent the rate 
of return to the resource as an asset. Thus, eq. (4) this is an 
indifference condition indicating that all assets hould yield 
the same marginal rate of return. The equilibrium is stable in 
the saddle-point sense and the saddle path is positively 
sloped (see Fig. 1). The larger uR, the larger is the equilibri- 
um resource stock. If uR is small, if the rate of regeneration is 
small and if the discount rate is large, then it may be optimal 
to exhaust the resource. Algebraically this corresponds tothe 
case where an equilibrium with a positive value of x(t) does 
not exist. 
x(t 
R u n(t) 
Fig. 1. Optimal use of a renewable r source. 
b) Uncoordinated Use of the Resource 
The reference scenario shows a social planner's olution to 
the renewable-resource problem. In many real-world cases, 
however, this is rather unrealistic. Property rights to re- 
sources are often incompletely defined regulating entities are 
missing. Let us look at simple (open-loop) Nash equilibrium 
where each player optimises its own choice of x(t) for given 
choices of the other units. For player i, the state constraint 
turns out to be 
R(t) = g(R(t)) - xi(t) - ~ j~ i  x~(t). (5) 
The Nash equilibrium is based on full information, i.e. 
each player seeks the optimal response to the optimal strate- 
gies chosen by the other players. This explains why, ex post, 
all players will do the same thing. Thus, we can drop the su- 
perscripts and the long-run equilibrium turns out to be 
g' + uR ~us. = r (6) 
This equilibrium again is saddle-point s able (if it exists). 
Compared to eq. (4), the term n has vanished. This implies 
that the equilibrium resource stock is smaller than in the ref- 
erence scenario. It is also possible that a resource which 
should be preserved from a social planner's point of view is 
exhausted within finite time by uncoordinated users. This is 
HARDIN's (1968) ,,Tragedy of the Commons". [See also 
GORDON (1954) for an early treatment of over-fishing 
problems and LEVHARI & MIRMAN (1980) and DOCK- 
NER et al. (1989) for modern approaches]. 
A central planner would be useful for the solution of the 
over-exploitation problem, but in reality this is unlikely to be 
a good policy suggestion. Rather would one like to use incen- 
tive-based resource-conservation schemes, e.g. environmen- 
tal tax rates. A tax rate which makes non-cooperative users of 
the resource behave as if they cooperated is given by: 
n -1  
0 = u x . (7) 
f /  
ux is the marginal utility derived from the use of an addition- 
al unit of the resource. Besides the individual under consid- 
eration, n - 1 other individuals can benefit. Each individual 
has to pay one nth of this amount. If the utility function is ad- 
ditively separable in its arguments, the tax rate is a declining 
function of the resource stock along the optimal path. This 
means, the larger the initial resource stock, the smaller is the 
initial environmental tax rate. 
c) Multi-species Problems 
Ecological complexity can be modelled by introducing addi- 
tional species. These species, or more generally: components 
of ecological systems may interact in a very complex fash- 
ion. STROBELE & WACKER (1995) have tried to model an 
optimum-resource-use problem for the still relatively simple 
case of two interacting species. This is a two-state-variables 
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optimal-control problem where optimal solutions are not 
necessarily saddle-point s able and cannot be derived explic- 
itly. Problems with more than two species are intractable un- 
less one takes recourse to dynamic simulation methods. If 
there are m species, the equilibrium is determined by 2m 
equations. Comparative statics with respect o r and n are 
ambiguous. Thus, it is not a priori clear whether or not a re- 
duction in the discount rate or a move from uncoordinated to 
coordinated resource use drives resource stocks up. Some re- 
source stocks may be reduced if a social planner enters the 
arena. Moreover, optimal paths are not generally saddle- 
point stable. Unstable solutions and limit cycles are feasible. 
Path dependence is also possible. E.g. after a period of unco- 
ordinated resource use, it is not always desirable to a benevo- 
lent social planner to restore the long-run equilibrium which 
would have been optimal had there been coordinated extrac- 
tion from the beginning. 
d) Incomplete Knowledge 
Given the problems one has with multi-species optimisation 
models, one may wish to use simpler approaches which nev- 
ertheless allow for some complexity. Assume that the true 
ecological interdependencies are not known. Then one may 
approximate he dynamics of the ecosystem by a stochastic 
differential equation, i.e. by a Wiener process where there is 
a stochastic nfluence in the state equation. Then: 
dR(t) = g(R(t))dt - nx(t)dt + s(x(t), R(t))dz (8) 
where dz is a normally distributed random variable with zero 
mean and variance dr. The stochastic component is the more 
important, the larger s is. The variance ofdR( t )d t  is increasing 
in s, and s itself may be a function of the resource stock and 
the extraction rate. The objective is to maximise the expected 
present value of future utility. Using Pontryagin's Maximum 
Principle (BISMUT 1975), one can derive a long-run equilib- 
rium where the expected resource stock and the expected ex- 
traction rate are both constant. It is characterised by
12 R - -  ~S R 
g' = 1" - n - -  (9) 
u x - ]'CS x 
zc is positive and can be interpreted as the cost of risk. In 
principle zc can be determined explicitly, provided that the 
model is simple enough. This proviso does not apply here. 
The interpretation f this equation is straightforward, how- 
ever. If a large resource stock increases the stochastic om- 
ponent of resource regeneration, then the long-run expected 
stock should be smaller than in the deterministic case. How- 
ever, it is probably more realistic to assume the converse, i.e. 
that an eco-system that has undergone substantial change 
due to human intervention is less resilient and more easily af- 
fected by exogenous variables. If the stochastic omponent 
is an increasing function of the extraction rate or, more gen- 
erally speaking, of the degree of human intervention i to the 
ecosystem, then the long-run stock should be larger than in 
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the deterministic case. The explanation for these results is 
the risk aversion which is implicit in the utility function. 
Risk-averse individuals and societies will always avoid risky 
activities to some extent. 
4. Final Remarks 
The paper has shed some light on the problems that arise 
when solutions to the management of complex ecological 
systems are sought. Although we have some ideas of what 
should be done, an exact and reliable analysis of the costs 
and benefits of environmental-policy measures i often not 
possible since the underlying information is not available. 
But it is not the lack of knowledge that explains the deficien- 
cies in the utilisation of environmental resources. Many eco- 
logical systems are still used as open-access common-prop- 
erty resources. The uncoordinated use and non-cooperative 
behaviour of the users lead to overexploitation. This problem 
is of particular severity in the case where different sovereign 
jurisdictions have access to a resource. International cooper- 
ation in environmental issues is a necessary (albeit unfort- 
unately not sufficient) measure to cope with these problems. 
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